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Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual
Justice by Collective Means
DAvID ROSENBERG*
INTRODUCTION
From the perspective of the common law tradition of individual justice,
class actions are a necessary evil, but an evil nonetheless. That tradition
projects the private law adjudicatory ideal: the norms of right, duty, and
remedy are applied according to the specific, relevant circumstances of the
particular parties in the given case.' It promises the parties not only their
own day in court, but a good deal of control over what is said and decided
on that day. 2
Class actions loom as a subversive element in this context because they
import the processes of bureaucratic justice-a mode of decision-making
associated with administrative agencies, which lacks the common law's tra-
ditional commitment to party control and focus on the discrete merits of
each claim. 3 In contrast to the party initiated and orchestrated common law
* Professor of Law, Harvard University. I would like to express my appreciation for the
helpful criticism of an earlier draft provided by Richard Stewart, Thomas Jackson and Lucien
Bebchuk, and for the research and editorial assistance provided by Johnathan Massey, Leonard
Gail, Lynn Blaise, Sally Hadden and Thomas Barnett.
1. See M. CoimN, LAw AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 251-52 (1933); M. FULLER, Tim PROBLEMS
OF JURISPRUDENCE 706 (temp. ed. 1949); H.M. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PRocESS: BAsIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 185 (temp. ed. 1958); Hohfeld, Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 passim
(1913).
2. R. FmL, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BAsiC CoURsE IN CrvIL PRO-
CEDURE 28 (4th ed. 1978).
3. For a provocative elaboration of the statism and collectivism inherent in modem forms
of bureaucratic justice, see generally, J. MAsHAw, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983). Cf. Michelman,
Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1986).
Class actions have frequently been criticized for inducing courts to ignore the individualizing
requirements of substantive rules and, instead to adopt averaged, class-wide standards; see, e.g.,
Scott, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule lOb-5, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 337 (1971). Because
they greatly diminish the role of the parties in controlling the process, class actions are vulnerable
to the further, broader criticism that they undermine important traditional barriers against partisan
and substantive judicial intervention in the preparation, presentation, and settlement of claims.
See, e.g., Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 306
(1986); Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions,
1983 DUKB L.J. 1265; Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374 (1982); Schuck, The
Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CH. L. REv.
337 (1986).
The analogy to administrative process is also a consistent staple of class action commentary.
See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2974 (1985) ("a class action
resembles a 'quasi-administrative proceeding, conducted by the judge.' " (quoting 3B J. MooRx
& J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTCE § 23.45[4-5] (1984)); Kalven & Rosenfield, The
Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. REv. 684 passim (1941).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
trial, bureaucratic justice gives decisionmakers the controlling hand over the
issue agenda as well as over the type and extent of evidence considered.4
But bureaucratic justice is most strikingly antithetical to notions of individual
justice because it legitimates the aggregation and averaging of circumstances
and interests of affected individuals in pursuit of the collective benefits from
process efficiency, outcome consistency, and the maximum production of
substantive goods. These goals are implemented through "public law" pro-
cedures which combine claims for uniform and summary treatment according
to classifications based on a set of salient, if partial, common variables
relating to the individuals involved.5
Nowhere do class actions seem a more alien force than in the torts system,
which epitomizes the individual justice tradition.6 The hallmark of this sys-
tem-at least as a formal matter-is its adherence to the "private law"
mode of case-by-case, particularized adjudication. 7 Attention is lavished on
the particular details of each claim to ensure that the norms of liability and
remedy are tailored to the specific facts of the defendant's conduct and its
causal relationship to the plaintiff's injury. Every effort is made to avoid
(or at least minimize) the erroneous redistribution of wealth that occurs when
4 .See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335-39 (1976); Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 389-401 (1971).
5. See, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461, 468-69 (1983) (concluding that there
exist neither statutory nor constitutional obstacles to the use by the Social Security Administration
of a "grid" consisting of a four-factor matrix-physical condition, age, education, and work
experience-to categorize and determine individual disability claims).
The dichotomy between individual and bureaucratic justice-which, like most conceptualiza-
tions is in reality a continuum of tensions and contradictions-reflects another, more abstract
categorization in forms of decision making. Corresponding to the particularizing nature of
individual justice is the context-based form of decisionmaking-an ad hoc, multifactored, bal-
ancing of competing interests on a case-by-case basis. Juxtaposed to contextual decisionmaking
is the form that operates from general classifications and statistical rationality. See Michelman,
supra note 3. The dichotomy between contextual and generalized decisionmaking has received
an ideological gloss consistent with a good deal of contemporary legal scholarship, an extreme
example being the pop socio-political theory associating the contextual form with the "feminine
voice" (connoting "good") and generalized form with the "male" (connoting "bad"). See C.
GrtoAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Con-
stitutional Adjudication, 72 YALE L. REv. 543 (1986); see also, e.g., MacKinnon, Feminism,
Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SioNs 635, 638 (1983); Scales,
The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1376-80 (1986).
Both sets of dichotomies pose deep epistemological questions as to whether knowledge of the
general-knowledge founded on probabilistic predictions and inferences-is separable and distinct
from knowledge of the particular-knowledge that captures the intrinsic and unique aspects of
a specific situation.
6. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281,
1282-83 (1976); Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAIiF. L. Rnv. 555, 604 (1985);
Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 779, 819 & n.
224 (1985).
7. Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision
of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 849, 900-05 (1984).
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innocent defendants are held liable or deserving plaintiffs denied compen-
sation."
In mass tort cases involving claims for personal injury,9 which pose daunt-
ing problems of causation and remedy, the price of individual justice is
notoriously high.'0 Because they typically involve complex factual and legal
questions, mass tort claims are exceedingly, if not prohibitively, expensive
to litigate. The questions of whether the defendant's conduct failed to satisfy
the governing standard of liability frequently entail interrelated technological
and policy issues that require extensive discovery, expertise, and preparation
to present and resolve adequately. Equally demanding are the causation
issues in mass tort cases, such as whether the plaintiff's condition was caused
by exposure to the substance in question or to some other source of the
same disease risk."
The case-by-case mode of adjudication magnifies this burden by requiring
the parties and courts to reinvent the wheel for each claim. The merits of
each case are determined de novo even though the major liability issues are
8. See Fried, Is Liberty Possible?, in 3 TBE TANNER LECTURES ON HtMA VALUES 91, 120-
21 (S. McMurrin ed. 1982); Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of
Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 190 (1981).
9. Mass accidents characteristically involve hazardous activities of a relatively small number
of business enterprises, which inflict personal injury and the risk of personal injury on relatively
large segments of the population. The injury and risk from such accidents may be sustained
simultaneously or sequentially, over long periods of time by members of the victim population.
In contrast to mass disaster accidents such as the collapse of two skywalks in the lobby of the
Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel, which killed 114 and seriously injured at least 212 others,
see In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo. 1982), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th
Cir. 1982), mass exposure accidents involve long latency disease striking victims who are widely
dispersed over decades and territory. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 851-55; Weinstein,
Preliminary Reflections on the Law's Reaction to Disasters, 11 CoLUM. J. ENT. L. 1 (1986).
The catastrophic effects from exposure of millions of insulation workers to asbestos, illustrate
the nature and consequences of modem mass exposure accidents. For an insightful and graphic
report of the asbestos litigation see, P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUcT: THE ASBESTOS
INDUSTRY ON TwAL (1985). For another case history of a mass exposure accident, but one which
broadly articulates and examines the complex questions of institutional efficacy and legitimacy
such accidents pose for the tort system, see P. ScmJcK, AGENT ORANGE ON TmiAL: MASS Toxic
DisAsTRns m= COURTS (1986).
10. Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REv. 429 (1986); Weinstein, supra
note 9, at 30 & n.92.
11. See Rosenberg, supra note 7; Weinstein, supra note 9, at 9-10.
Other costly and complicated questions frequently raised by mass accident cases include
questions of choice of law and extraterritorial jurisdiction for claims asserted by non-resident,
of the existence and extent of insurance coverage, and of allocating the assets and interests in
bankrupt defendant firms among present and future victims and between victims and other
creditors and defendant firms. See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at
Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Jemberg, Insurance for
Environmental and Toxic Risks: Basic Analysis of the Gap Between Liability and Coverage, 34
FED'N INS. CoUNs. Q. 123 (Winter 1984); Note, Adjudicating Asbestos Insurance Liability:
Alternatives to Contract Analysis, 97 HARv. L. RE,. 739 (1984); Note, Recent Development,
Toxic Torts and Chapter 11 Reorganization: The Problem of Future Claims, 38 VAND. L. Ray.
1369, 1395-96 (1985).
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common to every claim arising from the mass tort accident, and even though
they may have been previously determined several times by full and fair
trials.'2 These costs exclude many mass tort victims from the system and
sharply reduce the recovery for those who gain access. Win or lose, the
system's private law process exacts a punishing surcharge from defendant
firms as well as plaintiffs.
These costs of litigation, which are borne directly by the parties, also cast
a broad array of shadow prices that have widespread indirect effects. The
redundant adjudication of mass tort claims thus consumes vast quantities
of public resources, raising the price of access for other, sporadic, types of
tort claims. 13 Moreover, even though most of the claims arising from mass
accidents are eventually settled on the basis of recovery patterns projected
from relatively few trials, 14 the settlement calculus will reflect the costs of
redundant, de novo, particularized adjudication, as well as the incentives of
each party to increase the litigation expenses for the other. These conditions
generally disadvantage claimants. Because defendant firms are in a position
to spread the litigation costs over the entire class of mass accident claims,
while plaintiffs, being deprived of the economies of scale afforded by class
actions, can not, the result will usually be that the firms will escape the full
loss they have caused and, after deducting their attorneys' shares, the victims
will receive a relatively small proportion of any recovery as compensation. 5
12. See Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A Story of Asbestos-Carnage, Cover-up, and
Litigation (Book Review), 99 HAgv. L. REv. 1693, 1701 (1986).
13. I have elsewhere distinguished mass accidents from "sporadic" accidents such as auto-
mobile collisions-what Holmes termed "isolated, ungeneralized wrongs"-from "mass" acci-
dents. See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 854-55.
14. See D. HENSLER, W. FatsrnER, M. SELviN & P. EBENER, ASBESTOS IN THE COuRTS: TH
CHALLENGE OF MASS Toxic ToRTs (1985) (published by Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil
Justice) [hereinafter D. HENSLER]; Elliott, supra note 3, at 324 n.74.
15. Some recent commentary urges courts and Congress to consider developing and expanding
the scope of class action alternatives, particularly test-case, pattern settlements, and trans-jurisdiction consolidation of state and federal claims. See, e.g., Miller & Crump, Jurisdiction
and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YAlE
L.J. 1, 77 (1986); Transgrud, supra note 6 passim. These commentators fail to recognize the
inadequacy of such alternatives in the toxic tort context where information, cost barriers, and
the long latency periods of diseases such as cancer prevent the initiation and actual (even if
informal) joinder of many claims.
More generally, when the sole alternative to case-by-case adjudication consists of procedures,
such as pattern settlements and consolidation, which curtail redundancy and spread litigation
expenses only partially or not at all among all benefited claimants, the costs of that residual
degree of inefficiency will be deducted from the settlement offered to each claimant. The
availability of a class action alternative to case-by-case adjudication is necessary if there is to
be any substantial reduction of individualizing litigation costs and their bite from the compen-
sation received by victims. See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 911-12 & nn.236-37. For these reasons,
and, in addition, because of free rider problems and the high costs of administration and
duplicative effort, the "litigation network" approach, see Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney
General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv.
215, 239-41 & nn.56-57 (1983), by which a number of plaintiff lawyers voluntarily coordinate
and share the expense and fruits of their discovery work, will rarely if ever serve as an efficient
and substantively adequate alternative to class actions.
[Vol. 62:561
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As a consequence, the tort system's primary objectives of compensation and
deterrence are seriously jeopardized."
Despite their potential for reducing litigation costs and burdens, and,
consequently, enhancing the system's capacity to achieve its compensation
and deterrence objectives, class actions have consistently received a hostile
reception in mass tort cases.17 In opposing class actions, these decisions and
supporting commentary draw upon the individual justice tradition and its
rejection of the modes of bureaucratic justice."8 The common premise of
these and similar objections to mass tort class actions is that the bureaucratic
justice of class treatment-the collectivization of claims for aggregative and
averaged disposition-achieves administrative goals of efficiency, consist-
ency, and maximum substantive output by subordinating the interests of
individual victims (although not of defendant firms) to the interests of the
16. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 900-05.
17. See generally Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323
(1983); see, e.g., In re Asbestos School Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1985), vacated, 791 F.2d 920 (3rd Cir. 1986); In re
Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984).
Although the wasteful and abusive consumption of resources by mass tort cases is well known,
the courts have tended to discount these problems, giving the demands of individual justice
almost automatic priority over the need for class action efficiencies. See Trangsrud, supra note
6, at 819. In part, this response may be a product of limited perception of the problems. Courts
rarely experience the effects of this inefficiency directly or recognize their systemic implications
on compensation and deterrence. This shortsightedness may be due to the detailed character of
the very inquiry required to fulfill the mandate of individual justice in any given case. Concen-
tration on the particulars is likely to obscure patterns and connections with other cases. See
Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REV. 4, 27-28
(1982); Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Pmxn. & PUB. A. 107 (1976); Rosenberg,
supra note 7, at 885 & n.141.
Moreover, complexity compounded by high litigation costs also skews liability theories in the
direction of more easily provable particularistic claims, such as product manufacturing defect
claims predicated on alleged departures from a defendant firm's professed standard of quality
and performance, and away from more programmatic challenges to the standard itself. Cf.
Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAtiF. L. REv. 435, 459-61 & nn.
157-68 (1979). Another factor diluting the effects and perception of inefficiency is the decentralized
structure of the tort system, which disperses decisionmaking over time and over widely separated
territorial and jurisdictional domains. Finally, only a minute fraction of the tort claims that
arise or that are filed ever come to the formal attention of courts; in excess of ninety percent
are settled. See D. HENSLER, supra note 14; H. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL
PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAms AD.usmTmET (1970); Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compen-
sation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 57 (1975); Weinstein, supra
note 9, at 23. A number of these settlements include court enforceable secrecy provisions
preventing plaintiffs and their attorneys from disclosing the nature of the claim, the information
obtained during discovery, and the terms of settlement. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104
S. Ct. 2199 (1984); Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 1701. While some claims may be settled through
the good offices of judges, the number of such settlements is relatively small, and, in any event,
direct judicial oversight of the substantive adequacy of their terms is all but precluded by relative
lack of information, and by norms of impartiality and deference to party control. Cf. P. ScmcK,
supra note 9, at 143; Resnik, supra note 3.
18. See supra notes 3-5.
1987]
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class as a whole. 19 Under this critique, the extent to which the interests of
individual victims are sacrificed is measured against the baseline of how their
claims would fare in separate actions. Class actions, for example, are found
unacceptable because they transfer control over the case from the individual
to the class as an entity, or more accurately, the class attorney.20 In toxic
tort cases, class actions are viewed as a device for undermining causation
requirements through averaging. 21 Instead of differentiating the "risk port-
folios" applicable to each victim in the exposed population, 22 class actions
invite courts to make causal determinations on an undifferentiated basis for
all members of defined reference groups or subclasses, or even for all
members of the victim class as a whole.
Individual justice critiques of class actions have little power when the
primary purpose of tort liability is taken to be the utilitarian objective of
maximizing welfare by deterring socially inappropriate risk-taking.23 The
aggregation and averaging techniques of bureaucratic justice are not only
consistent with the social welfare justification for tort liability-at least,
when defendant firms are not on the whole under or overcharged-but they
also produce the positive benefits of lower administrative costs.2A When,
however, tort liability serves to vindicate rights to personal security trans-
gressed by a defendant's wrongful conduct, the individual justice arguments
against class actions may, depending on the normative content of the rights
posited, suggest the location of certain outside limitations on the use of class
actions in mass tort cases. 2 But, as I will explain below, these individual
19. See P. SCHUCK, supra note 9, at 269.
20. See Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL
STuD. 779 (1986).
Class actions are also criticized for providing disproportionately greater compensaton to less
severely injured victims in comparison to and at the expense of the compensation received by
more severely injured victims. See P. SCHUCK, supra note 9, at 264.
21. Cf. Scott, supra note 3.
22. See Elliott, Why Courts? Comment on Robinson, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 799, 803 (1985)
(opposing mass tort class actions because the "composition of the 'risk portfolio' is unique for
each individual so that ... the common issues of fact [relating to proof of causation] do not
predominate.").
23. See generally G. CALABREsi, Tim CosTs OF AccmaDNTs (1970); S. SirvELL, TBm EcoNomac
ANALYSiS OF TORT LAW (unpublished manuscript); Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic
Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REv. 851 (1981).
24. See Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven,
Jr., 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 69 (1975); Epstein, Two Fallacies in the Law of Joint Torts, 73 GEo.
L.J. 1377 (1985).
* 25. Generally, rights-based limits would be reached when, as measured by the relevant
entitlements baseline, collectively averaged treatment redistributes to one class of claimants the
welfare of another class, which receives no offsetting benefits. Redistribution would not of itself
warrant affording the disadvantaged claimants individually particularized treatment, unless the
process of separate actions presented a less pronounced danger of redistribution than the class
action. As such, process is merely an instrument for doing distributional justice. It is possible,
of course, to conceive of process as having intrinsic participatory value, which should then be
[Vol. 62:561
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justice arguments are exaggerated. They ignore not only the realities of
claimant dependency and powerlessness in individual actions, but they also
fail to recognize the existence of collectivizing forces operating in the mass
accident context, particularly the class-wide nature of the risk ex ante, which
exerts a unifying influence over the security interests (deterrence) and pro-
tective responses (insurance) of the potential accident victims. A major aim
of this paper is to demonstrate that, given such ex ante conditions, bureau-
cratic justice implemented through class actions provides better opportunities
for achieving individual justice than does the tort system's private law,
disaggregative processes.
This paper examines the asserted conflict between the ideal of individual
justice and the collective processes of class actions. Section I sketches the
aggregative and averaging possibilities afforded by class actions in mass tort
cases, and outlines the utilitarian as well as rights-based justifications for
their relatively non-controversial use in overcoming the cost barriers that
prevent access to the system. It also responds to objections raised against
class actions from these theoretical perspectives. Criticisms of class actions,
and the "public law" approaches they exemplify, as inefficient methods of
regulating risk are shown to be substantially overstated. Rights-based ob-
jections will be seen to fail because their central assumption-the equation
of individual trial outcomes and individual justice-is contingent and prob-
lematic. Moreover, both sets of objections are largely based on an inadequate
understanding of the class action mechanism.
Section II demonstrates the existence of important intersections in the
mass tort context where the ends of individual justice are better served by
collective, rather than by disaggregative, processes. This will be true generally
when the substantive liability or remedial norm is collective in nature. 26 But,
incorporated in the entitlements baseline. See MicheIman, The Supreme Court and Litigation
Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights, 1973 Dusz L.J. 1153, 1193-97. But, it would
be incorrect to equate the participatory value with the notion of individual control. The parti-
cipatory value could just as easily be expressed in terms of the group solidarity promoted by
the collective processes of class actions.
In any event, while class actions are often criticized for denying individual control, the criticism
is usually expressed as an instrumental rather than ontological argument. That is, individual
control is respected not for its own sake, but as a means to such ends as the venting of emotions
to ameliorate alienation and the potential for violence. See Trangsrud, supra note 6, at 820
(emphasizing the "psychological and emotional importance of individually vindicating [one's]
rights against the responsible parties" in cases of severe personal injury). But even if it could
be said that individual control should be valued for its own sake, and should be given greater
weight than group solidarity, individual control is not necessarily, as I explain infra notes 78-
85 and accompanying text, precluded by class actions.
26. Collective normative premises in tort law are well illustrated by the justifications con-
ventionally given for strict products liability. See generally Calabresi, supra note 24. Using strict
products liability to achieve optimal deterrence obviously implies the collective norm of maxi-
mizing social welfare. To the extent that consumers lack sufficient information to gauge the
risks latent in the products and services they purchase, the threat of "strict" manufacturer
19871
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for the purposes of this section, governing norms are assumed to possess
an individualistic content. 27 The explanation for the harmonies in individual
and bureaucratic justice rests instead on a critique of the substantive dis-
tortions created by the tort system's traditional private law process. The
disaggregative, linearly retrospective character of this process leads courts
to ignore the ex ante effects of accident risks on the rights and lives of the
at-risk population. Because these risks are frequently indivisibly experienced
class-wide, their pre-accident effects on the at-risk population will be uniform
and average in nature. In these situations, unless the due care liability norm2
and the make whole remedial norm2 9 are applied on an aggregate and
averaged basis, the distributional fairness implicit in the notion of individual
justice will be thwarted.
I. AGGREGATION AND AVERAGING OF CLAIMS IN A MASS TORT
CLASS ACTION
Opposition to aggregation and averaging in mass tort class actions is in
fact largely anticipatory. In the relatively few class actions which have been
certified, the scope of collective adjudication has been narrowly circumscribed
to preserve party control and the opportunity for individualized determi-
nations of noncommon liability and damage questions.30 Most of the public
liability (with appropriate defenses of product misuse and contributory negligence) may serve to
maximize social welfare not only by inducing due care in the production and marketing of these
goods but also by achieving the efficient levels of consumption and of consequent hazard. See
S. SHAVELL, supra note 23. Similarly, the loss spreading justification of strict products liability
implements social justice by pooling risks. Strict liability simultaneously relieves the injured of
concentrated loss and distributes that burden in relatively small portions to those who have
benefited from the product or service. See K. ABRAHAM, DIsTgnBu'NGG RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL
THEoRY, AND PUBLIc POLICY 26 (1986); cf. ARIsToTLE, NIcHoMAcHEAN ETmcs V.5.II32b-.II34a(W. Ross trans. 1926); Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHiL. &
Pm. Ass. 283 (1981). For enlightening elaboration and critique of strict product liability schol-
arship, see Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
27. It is also assumed, for purposes of this section that there are no significant cost and
information barriers preventing resort to separate actions for mass tort claims.
28. The "due care" reference is meant to encompass rights-based notions of negligence,
under which liability requires a finding that the defendant was at fault or acted wrongfully. See
Posner, supra note 8; Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law,
58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 796 (1983).
29. The "make whole" reference incorporates the notion of tort damages as generally seeking
to restore plaintiffs to the distributional position they would have occupied had the accident not
occurred. See East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2295 & n.9
(1986); Prosser, The Borderland Between Tort and Contract, in SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 380, 424-27 (Thomas M. Cooley Lectures, Fourth Series 1953).
30. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979) (conditional
order granting class certificatoin), vacated, 100 F.R.D. 336 (D. Mass. 1983) (class action decer-
tified); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (certifying
plaintiff class action), vacated, 611 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (granting manufacturers'
motion for summary judgment against opt-out plaintiffs on grounds of failure to establish causation
and to overcome government contract defense).
[Vol. 62:561
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law procedures which might be used in mass accident class actions-especially
aggregating claims on a mandatory basis and averaging causation and dam-
ages-have been employed only in settlements, and never by coercive court
order. 3' Indeed, even when mass tort class actions have been certified for
trial, the collective process is entirely elective since class members are entitled
to opt out in favor of individual actions.12 Class treatment, moreover, has
been extended solely to the common questions of law and fact concerning
liability, preserving the right to an individual trial on damages. 33 In some
cases courts have gone slightly beyond the conventional bifurcation of lia-
bility and damage elements of the tort cause of action. They have instead
designated certain common liability issues for class treatment, while re-
manding the remaining liability questions relating to the circumstances of
each class member to an individual trial before, or along with, determination
of damages. 34
A. Potential Applications of Public Law Process: Mandatory
Class Actions and Damage Scheduling
Although contemporary class action practice generally respects the prin-
ciples of individual justice by maintaining voluntary participation, critics of
the procedure correctly recognize its potential to develop in more innovative
public law directions. 35 Mandatory class actions combined with damage
scheduling are two changes in current practice that would have the most
important applications to mass torts, especially those involving long-latency
disease risks from toxic substance exposure. 36 Class actions would be man-
31. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
For a description of the Agent Orange settlement, see P. ScHUCK; supra note 9, at 143.
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) guarantees absentees the right to opt out of the class action in
favor of separate actions on all issues, common as well as individual. The "opt-out right" may
now have received constitutional status, at least in state class actions asserting extra-territorial
jurisdiction over absentees. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2695 (1985); Miller
& Crump, supra note 15, at 52.
Certification of "mandatory" class actions pursuant to FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(1) or (b)(2),
under which there is no opt-out right, have been consistently denied. See, e.g., In re Asbestos
School Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 789 F.2d 986 (3d
Cir. 1985), vacated, 791 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield"
IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd and vacated, 693 F.2d 847
(9th Cir. 1982); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Ct., 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
33. See, e.g., Payton, 83 F.R.D. 382. Bifurcation for class-wide resolution of liability ques-
tions and individualization of damages is endorsed by FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(4), 1966 advisory
committee note. See generally 7B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE Ai
PROCEDURE § 1790 (2d ed. 1986).
34. See, e.g., In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Beverly
Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983); Payton, 83
F.R.D. 382.
35. See, e.g., P. ScmrucK, supra note 9; Trangsrud, supra note 6.
36. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 905.
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datory both in the sense that (i) courts could act on their own initiative to
certify pending and future mass tort claims for class treatment, and (ii) there
would be no opportunity to opt out in order to prosecute a separate action
on the issues common to all claims as well as the issues specific to each. 7
To achieve even greater efficiencies in the process, courts would impose
damage schedules based on the average loss suffered by members of relevant
subclasses or even by the class as a whole.3"
The choice of disaggregative over collective adjudication for mass tort
accidents has profound consequences for the parties as well as the tort
system's compensation and deterrence objectives. The costs of traditional
disaggregative, private law processes exclude many claims from the system.
The cost barriers are compounded by other prevalent conditions, such as
the low income status of a significant number of the victims, and the relatively
low probability of success at trial that characterizes these legally and factually
complex cases. In addition, to the extent that courts begin to use proportional
liability to resolve the causation issues that routinely arise in toxic tort cases,
the costs of disaggregative process are magnified in the evaluation of these
claims by plaintiff attorneys. Many of these claims are rendered unmarketable
to competent plaintiff attorneys because the returns on their contingent fee
investment, which are likely to be marginally competitive to begin with for
the reasons noted above, are discounted in proportion to the probability of
causation in each case.39 As a result, many victims not only are denied access
to the system and receive no compensation, but the deterrent effects of
threatened liability are significantly reduced.
In addition, the case-by-case, individualized processing of the mass tort
claims that are filed confers a strategic edge upon defendant firms. While
37. As discussed infra note 92, the mandatory nature of the class action might be relaxed
in certain cases to allow individual trials on damages. In that event, however, the individual
trials would be conducted not in separate actions, but under the auspices and supervisory authority
of the class action.
38. Recent advances in epidemological and related methodologies have made such damage
scheduling feasible. See Lagakos & Mosteller, Assigned Shares in Compensation for Radiation-
Related Cancers, 6 RIsK ANAYsis 345 (1986). This paper reports on the development by the
National Institutes of Health of radioepidemiologic tables pursuant to congressional mandate in
Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 7, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (Jan. 4, 1983), appended to the Orphan Drug
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 241 (1985). These tables are designed to facilitate the use of causally proportioned
liability in the trial of damage claims arising from atomic bomb tests in the western states as
well as from other accidents involving radiation exposure. The tables go beyond the undiffer-
entiated form of proportional liability-which would apportion damages according to the average
probability of causation for the exposed population as a whole. Representing state-of-the-art
epediological analysis, the tables prescribe formulas for partitioning the exposed population into
a hierarchy of subgroups or reference sets, and for assigning to each a value derived from the
set's fractional share of the aggregate excess disease incidence in the population as a whole. For
a critical commentary on the tables' effort to enable proportional liability at the subgroup level,
see Rosenberg, The Uncertainties of Assigned Shares Tort Compensation: What We Don't Know
Can Hurt Us, 6 RISK ANALYsis 363 (1986).
39. See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 894.
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it prevents victims from deriving the benefits of concerted action, the tra-
ditional process has no similar effect on the capacity of defendant firms to
spread litigation costs and prepare the common questions efficiently on a
once-and-for-all basis. Most liability issues will be substantially the same for
all claims arising from a given mass accident, and thus defendants can always
aggregate claims to exploit (at times quite abusively) the efficiencies of a
virtual class action.40 Because of their cost-spreading advantages, a defendant
firm typically can afford not only to invest more in developing the merits
of the claim than the opposing plaintiff attorney, but also to finance a "war
of attrition" through costly discovery and motion practice that depletes the
adversary's litigation resources. 41 The consequences of redundantly litigating
common questions thus skews the presentation of the merits, promotes
abusive strategic use of procedure, needlessly consumes public resources,
and ultimately drains away a large amount of the funds available to redress,
by judgment or settlement, victim losses.
While defendant firms enjoy litigation cost advantages because of the
system's traditional disaggregative processes, the most consistently successful
beneficiaries of case-by-case adjudication are the lawyers-both for defend-
ants and plaintiffs. 42 A major factor in the escalating costs of the tort system
is attorney fees, against which there are no presently effective market or
regulatory controls. Defense lawyers -contribute to the dismal ratio of liti-
gation costs to net compensation in mass tort litigation by exploiting their
hourly fee arrangements. Under such arrangements defense lawyers have
every incentive to make work for themselves, particularly by grossly over-
staffing multi-defendant cases, and by resisting any collective process re-
placement for case-by-case adjudication. Although their clients gain to some
degree from these practices, because they translate into increased litigation
expense for plaintiffs, the costs inflicted on the public-in terms of the
needless consumption of attorney and judicial resources-by defense attorney
avarice are unmitigated. For similar reasons, plaintiff attorneys, too, prefer
disaggregative process. Class treatment of mass tort claims from a particular
accident requires only a fraction of tie legal services provided by plaintiff
attorneys compared to case-by-case adjudication, which disperses claims
widely over territory and time.41 That courts have the power in class actions
40. See id. at 902.
To be sure, plaintiff attorneys are "repeat players" who can hedge against the risks of litigation
by diversifying their portfolio of cases. But such diversification is unlikely to enable attorneys
to offset the concentrated risks of multiple mass tort claims. This is because expertise developed
in litigating the mass tort claims will have only the most general application in the vast bulk of
the cases comprising the attorney's portfolio.
41. See Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 1705.
42. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 12; Coffee, supra note 15, at 247.
43. The dimensions of plaintiff attorney stakes and interests in preserving separate actions
are indicated by the billion dollars in contingency fees guaranteed plaintiff attorneys in order
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to review class settlements and to determine class attorney fees helps to
explain plaintiff attorney aversion to collective process."
Class treatment of these claims would produce radically different results
from those generated by traditional case-by-case adjudication. 41 Class action
aggregation would very likely make the low value claims marketable to
competent plaintiff attorneys, and therefore firms would be faced with
liability for a much larger percentage of the compensable losses resulting
from mass tort accidents. If mandatory class actions were convened by courts
on their own initiative, the unnecessary costs of redundantly litigating the
common questions presented in marketable mass tort claims would be elim-
inated. In addition, mandatory certification would substantially diminish the
incentives of defendants to exploit their cost advantages in individual actions,
and would negate the motivation of and eliminate the costly efforts by
plaintiff and defense attorneys to oppose class actions in order to protect
their fees rather than their clients' interests. The savings in administrative
expense would substantially increase the proportion of the awards recovered
by victims as compensation.
Damage scheduling could be used to further reduce litigation costs entailed
by the individualized determination of damages. 6 Such a procedure would
greatly increase access for low value claims.47 Because scheduling eliminates
much of the need for customized legal services, thus yielding even greater
returns in compensation on relatively high value claims than would indivi-
dualized determinations, it should not be used exclusively in low value class
actions. Regardless of the value of the claims involved, the most dramatic
cost savings could be achieved if the schedule provided compensation ac-
cording to the average income loss and probability of causation for the
population as a whole. Victims with above average losses or exposure might
to gain their support for including future claims in the Manville reorganization plan. See N.Y.
Times, Feb. 17, 1986, at Dl, col. 3. It did not phase these attorneys that exclusion of future
claims would very likely prevent reorganization and thus the firm's capacity to generate sufficient
income to compensate future victims of asbestos-related disease.
44. See Far. R. Civ. P. 23(e); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740
(approving settlement of class action); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp.
1296 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (awarding attorney's fees in class action).
45. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 7.
46. See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 917-19.
47. Damage scheduling is preferable to increasing fee awards as a means of encouraging
plaintiff attorneys to accept small claim class actions. Increased fee awards may all but defeat
the compensation goal by transferring most of the recovery to the class attorney. Dam, supra
note 17, at 52. Cf. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 567 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated and
remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (expressing "reluctan[ce] to permit actions to proceed where they
are not likely to benefit anyone but the lawyers who bring them"). From the perspective of
deterrence, moreover, increased attorney fees may create an excessive incentive .to bring suit.
See Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11
J. LaoAL STu. 333 (1982).
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well find that their treatment at a statistical average was more than offset
by the savings in litigation costs, including attorney fees.48
B. Utilitarian Deterrence and Bureaucratic Justice
The prevailing utilitarian justification for tort liability is to create optimal
incentives for accident avoidance.49 Accordingly, the threat of liability should
induce firms engaged in risky activities to take due or optimal care by
investing in safety precautions against accidents so long as the injury loss
avoided exceeds, at the margin, the expenditures on prevention. Threatened
tort liability also may advance deterrence objectives by compelling firms to
internalize the residual injury loss-loss which is unavoidable by optimal
care-thereby inducing moderation of their levels of activity and the cor-
responding levels of accident risk.50 When administrative expenses5' are taken
into account, the calculus becomes the extremely complicated one of max-
imizing the system's functional productivity in terms of the net benefits from
tort liability deterrence. 2
Public law processes promote this social welfare maximizing function of
tort liability in all phases, both by providing incentives to take optimal care
and to moderate activity levels, and by achieving sharp reductions in ad-
ministrative costs. By making relatively low value claims marketable to
competent plaintiff attorneys, class actions bolster the deterrent effect of
threatened tort liability. Absent class action treatment, the bulk of these
claims would be excluded from the system, reducing both the firm's incentives
to take precautions and its internalization of residual accident costs. The
potential for administrative cost savings is very high as well. Mandatory
class actions would radically reduce the consumption of party and public
resources for redundant, case-by-case adjudication. It would also substan-
tially diminish the cost advantage conferred on defendant firms by the private
law, disaggregative process-which in reality is disaggregative only on the
plaintiff side. Damage scheduling to replace individualized causation and
injury loss determinations would not only increase the marketability of very
low value claims, but also would increase the efficiency of the process overall.
48. Section II demonstrates that even in the absence of such offsetting benefits, aggregate
and averaging treatment may not only be reconcilable with principles of individual justice, but
will in a significant number of situations better effectuate those principles than the disaggregative
process of separate trials to individualize liability and damages.
49. See generally S. SHAVELL, supra note 23.
50. See Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 24-25 (1980).
51. These are the public and private costs incurred by the courts and the parties in determining
the factual basis of claims, in interpreting and applying the governing rules, and in conforming
behavior and practices to such rules.
52. For a general discussion of net benefit policy analysis, see E. STOKEY & R. ZacKHAUSER,
A Pamm- FOR PoucY ANALYSIS 134 (1978).
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Utilitarian criticism of the public law approach has been launched along
two fronts. Specifically, the approach is attacked for its potential to induce
an influx of low value mass tort claims that will displace previously mar-
ketable, higher value sporadic claims from the system."5 More generally, the
objection is that because of the system's inherent biases and other short-
comings, tort liability already stifles and overdeters productive activity, es-
pecially involving the development and marketing of new technology, and
the public law approach can only exacerbate the problem.5 4 A complete
assessment of these objections is beyond the scope of this paper, but as will
become apparent in the discussion below, both suffer from readily apparent
errors in reasoning, compounded, in the case of the second objection, by
rather implausible, unsupported assumptions.
1. The Displacement Argument and Plaintiff Attorney
Gatekeepers
The displacement argument predicts that by aggregating relatively low
value mass tort claims in a class action, tort system resources will be mo-
nopolized by an endless and costly stream of individual damage trials that
will undermine the system's functional productivity by excluding relatively
higher value sporadic claims s.5  There is, however, little substance to this
position. First, assuming that claims which are cost-effective for plaintiff
attorneys to prosecute are cost-effective for the system to process, 56 then
displacement is unlikely to occur at all. Unless the expected return from the
classed mass tort claims, net of the costs of litigating the common questions
and the individual questions in a series of individual damage trials, exceeds
the return expected from competing sporadic claims, plaintiff attorneys would
admit the sporadic and exclude the mass tort claims from the system. Func-
tioning as gatekeepers, plaintiff attorneys are thus likely to select among
competing claims, sporadic or mass tort, those which are the most admin-
istratively efficient for the system to process.
53. See Dam, supra note 17, at 52-53.
54. See Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in
the Courts, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 277 (1985).
55. This reason for denying mass tort class actions is implied by the statement in the 1966
advisory committee note to Rule 23 that "[a] 'mass accident' . . . is ordinarily not appropriate
for a class action because [given the individual questions of liability as well as damages]. . . an
action conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits
separately tried." FED. R. Crv. P. 23, advisory committee note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 103
(1966).
56. It is certainly plausible to assume a high degree of correspondence between private and
public burden entailed by the complex legal and factual questions which toxic tort claims typically
present. See McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53
U. C. L. Ray. 440, 478 (1986); Rubin, supra note 10; D. HENSLER, supra note 14.
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Second, the displacement argument assumes sporadic and mass tort claims
are fungible in terms of deterrence objectives. Because of the distinctive
nature of sporadic and mass tort accidents, this assumption is untenable.
For many reasons arising from the business policy origins of mass accidents-
the centralized, deliberate calculations of private costs and benefits-firms
that create such risks are amenable to the regulatory pressures from credible
threats of tort liability. In contrast, the fact that many sporadic accidents
result from individual, human misjudgments, lapses of attention, and im-
pulsiveness suggest that tort liability may have little or no deterrent effect
in such situations. Thus, measured by the deterrence objectives, the system's
functional effectiveness will be increased even if mass tort class actions
displace sporadic claims.
Third, the possibility of displacement can be minimized by employing
damage scheduling to eliminate all individual damage trials. This is because
the goal of deterrence, in a system governed by utilitarian principles can be
achieved by holding the defendant firm liable for the aggregate loss that its
tortious conduct caused, regardless of whether and how damages are dis-
tributed among plaintiffs. Although compensation is not a primary concern
when deterrence is the objective, it is nevertheless appropriate to note that
claimants who would otherwise have been priced out of the system by the
costs of individual damage trials would doubtless prefer even this extreme
form of bureaucratic justice-damage scheduling-to no justice at all. More-
over, it is likely that those who have suffered above average losses, albeit
of relatively low value, also would benefit from increased use of damage
scheduling, even to the point of distributing recovery on an equal shares
basis. The overall cost-savings generated by the aggregative treatment of
common questions and by the elimination of individual damage trials may
more than compensate these claimants for any difference between actual
losses suffered and the average loss for which they are reimbursed.
2. The Overdeterrence Argument and Marginal Utility Analysis
The overdeterrence argument is premised on the assumption that despite
its risks, the net benefits of new technology (e.g., nuclear power) exceed
those of the old technology, (e.g., fossil fuel generators, fireplaces, wool
sweaters) it replaces.57 According to this argument, the tort system-even in
its inefficient private law mode, but certainly when its potency is enhanced
by public law processes-overdeters firms that produce such new technology
in two ways. First, the system imposes the full social costs of the risk from
57. See Huber, supra note 54, at 288, 295-99. This presumption is accepted for the sake of
analysis, but the claim is most certainly debatable, especially when asserted as a generalization.
For advocacy of a more cautious stance towards new technology, see, e.g., Krier & Gillette,
The Un-Easy Case for Technological Optimism, 84 MicH. L. REv. 405 (1985).
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new technology on its producers even though they cannot capture its full
social benefits.18 Second, the system is so biased against the risks from new
technology that it blatantly ignores and hence perversely prefers the greater
risks of old technology. 9 Both propositions have serious logical flaws, and
can be salvaged only by making dubious factual assumptions.
The flaw in the first claim is its failure to recognize that while firms may
not fully capture the social benefits of new technology-in effect, creating
a consumer surplus-tort liability for the social costs can be absorbed into
the product or service price without undermining efficient consumption. To
the extent that demand decreases, it will reflect the choice of consumers at
the cost-benefit margin.
Although the uncaptured social benefits argument can be stated more
'broadly than a claim of consumer surplus, its analytical defect remains. The
argument as broadened asserts that the product or service price is insufficient
to incorporate the social benefits of new technology because they are not
confined to direct consumers, but are enjoyed indirectly by others and by
society collectively. The proposition that the benefits of new technology are
not limited to direct consumers is undeniable, but it does not prove that
tort liability will overdeter. The conclusion fails simply because it is founded
on a wholly unsupportable premise: that tort liability internalizes to defend-
ant firms the full measure of the social costs from new technology. Tort
liability comes nowhere near achieving such an all encompassing degree of
social cost internalization. Many of the losses suffered by victims are legally
immaterial;60 deemed too remote, 6' involve irreplaceable goods, 2 or are un-
derstated because they lack a market referent. 63 Moreover, the adverse effects
58. See Huber, supra note 54, at 291-92.
59. See id. at 309-11.
60. Examples include consequential damages, such as a child's loss of parental love, guidance
and companionship: see, e.g., Steiner v. Bell Telephone, 55 U.S.L.W. 2311 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov.
18, 1986); mental distress over future injury: see, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 386 Mass.
540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982); a family member's injury which the claimant did not witness first
hand: see, e.g., Mazzagatti v. Everingham, 516 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1986).
61. The doctrine of proximate cause traditionally has been applied in a broad if ad hoc
manner to constrain the scope of tort liability from reaching sources of risk and from redressing
injurious consequences which are considered too atenuated or conjectural even if causally con-
nected to the accident. See generally P. KEETON, D. DOaBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS 264 (1984).
62. It is doubtful that tort liability can ever provide anything resembling full compensation
for serious injuries let alone loss of life. See generally Mishan, Evaluation of Life and Limb:
A Theoretical Approach, 79 J. PoL. EcoN. 687 (1971) (criticizing various methods of valuing
the loss of life).
63. Examples include the costs imposed on future generations from environmental degra-
dation, the losses of life in the case of the very young and very old whose social value can not
be calculated by labor market measures, or the bearing of risks for which there is no insurance
market. See generally E. STottin & R. ZEcKHurusER, supra note 52, at 299-301.
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of accidents on third parties and the community generally and collectively
are not recoverable 4
The argument of uncaptured social benefits also fails because it completely
ignores that to the extent a social surplus exists, potential overdeterrence
can be ameliorated through a social decision by informed public represen-
tatives to "subsidize" the new technology, or, at least, a particular appli-
cation of it. The "subsidy" is merely a tax on the non-consumer, public
beneficiaries of the technology. Our nation has a long tradition of subsidizing
new technologies, often on a targeted basis, 65 and more indiscriminately
through tax incentives and indirect public investments, such as new roads
and higher education. By compelling public authorities to confront the social
costs of new technology, tort liability merely creates pressures for the po-
litically representative branches to make a deliberate, precise, and overt
decision whether the expected social benefits from a particular new tech-
nology are sufficiently great to warrant a commitment of social resources
to promote its development and deployment. It also focuses the attention
of public authorities on the distributional effects of the choice to subsidize
a new technological venture and the means selected to accomplish that end. 6
The broad social and narrower consumer surplus claims should also both
be rejected because they rest on the fundamentally erroneous premise that
activities deserve an exemption from tort liability merely because they gen-
64. See generally Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978);
Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387
(1981).
65. See M. HoRwrrz, Tim TRANSFORMATION OF AmmucAN LAW 31-108 (1977); see also, e.g.,
The Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982) (encouraging development of the atomic energy
industry by imposing a ceiling on tort liability damages for a single nuclear accident).
66. Tort liability may not be the most accurate and efficient cost-accounting method, but it
has the virtues of being largely impervious to political and economic pressures to ignore the
questions of risk and loss bearing. In any event, the tort system is likely to play no more than
a backstop role, since the prospect of liability should induce intervention by public authorities
before the new technology is marketed or becomes operative. Rather than the dismay expressed
by some commentators, see, e.g., Huber, supra note 54, the fact that firms are now publicly
seeking government support before they market products with substantial or unknown health
risks should be regarded as a healthy sign of public participation and accountability in the
subsidy policy-making process.
In light of the possibilities for public subsidies, the crisis tone of some tort system criticism
seems premature at best. Implicitly, such criticism reflects distrust of the political process for
deciding the fate of new technologies. By seeking to curtail the tort system's effectiveness in
regulating risk, new technology advocates appear to be following a strategy of seeking de facto
preference for such technology without an open hearing and assessment on its merits in the
democratic political process. Ironically, this strategy mirrors the tactics and motives of some
tort system supporters, who believe the tort and other common-law systems are prone to excesses
and manipulation in favor of the poor, workers, and other economically disadvantaged groups.
Tort claims provide the means for modern-day Robin Hoods to perpetrate hit-and-run raids on
corporate deep pockets. These tort system supporters share with the system's detractors a distrust
of the political process, the only difference being the supporters' conviction that the bias favors
new technology over the distributional interests of the disadvantaged.
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erate more benefits than costs. While total benefits exceed costs, there may
still be room for incremental or marginal improvements. The uncaptured
social benefit argument simplistically ignores the role of tort liability-
whether enforced under a negligence or strict standard-in reducing accident
costs at the margins. 67
The claim that immunity from tort liability ought to be conferred on new
technology when its net benefits exceed those of the old technology can only
be revived by assuming that consumers grossly and systematically under-
estimate the risks of old technology. 68 If this were the case, then price
increases induced by tort liability imposed on new technology would drive
consumers to old, riskier substitutes. This argument falls, however, because
of its implicit assumption that the old technological alternative for some
reason is exempt from tort liability. Outside of the relatively rare situation
where a consumer might choose to let nature take its course-for example,
by rejecting a prescription drug which has significant side effects but promises
an offsetting chance of recovery-the assumption appears to have little in
common with reality. Most old technologies of human design are subject to
tort liability just like the new. 69 Their costs therefore will reflect risk as-
sessments just as in the case of new technology.70
The second claim-that courts systematically ignore the risks of old tech-
nology and, in any event, lack the expertise to impose liability discrimin-
atingly-is founded entirely on implausible and cramped assumptions. Cer-
tainly there is no dearth of doctrine mandating judicial scrutiny of the relative
67. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 23.
Tort liability also represents a less costly means of controlling risk than conventional forms
of administrative regulation, which entail the expense of continuous surveillance and command
and control adjustments. For an analytical framework for comparatively assessing the effec-
tiveness of tort and administrative methods of controlling risk, see Shavell, Liability for Harm
Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984).
68. See Huber, supra note 54, at 315-20 (presuming that consumers are unaware of the risk
differential between new and old technology, and, more expansively, that risk is not a significant
factor in private consumption decisions).
69. Even while he decries the fate of new technology at the hands of the tort system, Huber
acknowledges that tort liability has been effective in providing appropriate risk reducing incentives
for producers of old technology. See Huber, supra note 54, at 331.
In addition, the assumption about consumer ignorance and indifference is unrealistic in failing
to appreciate the incentives producers of new technologies have to educate the public through
advertising and otherwise to the comparative advantages of the new over the old. Furthermore,
in many instances where new and old technology compete, intermediaries such as physicians,
insurance and other financial institutions, and public agencies are available and in many situations
affirmatively responsible for apprising consumers of the relative risks involved and, should the
need arise, for correcting irrational decisions.
70. Even if old technology were to receive a preference, which seems implausible, and in
any event is an empirical question, it would not necessarily inhibit development of socially
beneficial technologies. Rather, the investment decision would be made on the expectation that
should a given new technology prove beneficial, it would gain the arguably sheltered position
of an "old" technology.
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risks and expected benefits from competing technologies.7 1 The claim of
judicial indifference to the financial burden of liability on producers of new
and socially beneficial technology is refuted by the virtually universal ad-
herence to the unavoidably unsafe constraint on tort liability propounded
by Comment k to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 72
Defendant firms, moreover, have strong motivations to prevent any judicial
lapse of attention in this regard. 73 Finally, lack of expertise and other de-
ficiencies in the tort system can be corrected through "public law" reforms,
such as the use of blue ribbon juries assisted by court-appointed experts to
determine technical, medical and other scientific issues. 74
C. Rights-Based Compensation and Bureaucratic Justice
Rights-based justifications for tort liability are concerned with the fairness
of the distributional consequences of an accident for the individuals in-
71. The law is replete with such mandates, which over time have been expressed in more
sophisticated doctrinal formulations. It is enough for these purposes to note the multi-factored
analysis of benefits versus costs mandated for cases involving ultrahazardous and abnormally
dangerous activities, nuisance, and manufacturing and design defects in consumer products. See,
e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443 (1978); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 287 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S. 2d 312 (1970); RESTATE ENT (SEcoND) oF
ToRTs, §§ 519-20, 402A, 826.
72. See generally Schwartz, supra note 28.
73. One commentator embellishes the claim of systematic judicial bias against new technol-
ogies with two rather odd as well as unsupportable assumptions. See Huber, supra note 54, at
323-24, 332. The first is that epidemiologic and other scientific studies can identify the risks of
new technology but not its benefits. Any cursory review of the relevant medical and scientific
literature undermines this claim, and it is certainly in the interest of the producers of new
technology to sponsor benefit as well as risk studies. The second assumption is that defendant
firms are not effective advocates because they tend to exaggerate the benefits of their new
technologies, even to the point of intentionally misleading the courts. While this is a problem,
it is one that the confrontational features of the adversary system are specifically designed to
solve. Moreover, it would hardly be conducive to the maintenance of orderly process to reward
defendant firms with an exemption from tort liability for such abusive behavior.
74. Injecting so much bureaucratic justice into the tort system necessarily raises the question
of whether the deterrence and compensation functions of the tort system ought to be transferred
to an administrative agency. Contrary to the strong but unexplained faith some commentators
have expressed in the administrative solution, see, e.g., Huber, supra note 54, at 330 (waxing
to the point of revealing naIvet6: e.g., administrative agencies will make the correct cost-benefit
decision "because their focus is a relentlessly public one." Id. at 332); Sugarman, supra note
6, at 651-54, 660 (1985) (placing chief reliance on agency regulation while noting parenthetically
that there are some problems with the administrative solution), the merits of such a solution
are far from unambigious. The history of regulatory laxity, timidity, and even co-optation in
regard to certain large-scale risks does not generate optimism. J. ARTABANE & C. BATMER,
DEFuSINo THE ASBEsTos LITIGATION CEISIS: THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TBE U.S. GOVERNMENT (1986);
see Slawson, The Right to Protection from Air Pollution, 59 S. CAL. L. Rav. 667, 718 (1986).
Indeed, abandonment of the tort system in favor of an administrative solution would sacrifice
the vital role played by plaintiff attorneys in developing and publicizing evidence of mass torts
affecting the health of thousands of people, as well as administrative failure to respond in timely
and adequate fashion. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1267, 1269
(E.D.N.Y. 1985).
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volved.75 Theories of distributional fairness range along a spectrum from
traditional notions of corrective justice to less fault-laden norms holding
that the beneficiaries of risky activity should bear the losses of the relatively
few who are injured. 76 Because of its individualistic premises, corrective
justice will provide the critical perspective from which to evaluate the attempt,
undertaken in the balance of this paper, to locate significant intersections
between individual and bureaucratic justice.
Conventionally, the theory of corrective justice is generated from three
axioms. 77 First, the value of individual entitlements to personal security
should be protected against, at a minimum, wrongful or nonconsensual
invasions. 78 Second, those who have not in fact invaded the personal security
of the victim or who have not done so wrongfully should be free from legal
responsibility for the victim's loss. Third, victims should be made whole-
restored to their pre-accident distributional positions-by anyone who has
wrongfully invaded their entitlements to personal security.
Because money judgments can never in principle or reality provide a perfect
substitute for the right not to be wrongfully harmed in the first place, a
postulate of rights-based deterrence should supplement the traditional prem-
ises of corrective justice.79 Pursuant to this augmented theory of corrective
justice, the function of the tort system is to protect rights to personal security
75. See Hoffman & Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental Examination
of Subjects' Concepts of Distributive Justice, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1985).
76. The latter type of theory may address only situations where the injured are strangers
and not within the benefitting class, or may apply broadly to potential beneficaries as well
through complex causal, collective good, and probabilistic foresight arguments. Because the
goods which benefit society as a whole cannot feasibly be produced without some risk of personal
injury, it is reasonable to extrapolate from principles of personal autonomy a duty on the part
of society to compensate those statistically destined to suffer the losses, which in effect constitute
the inevitable human overhead of the given social enterprise. Such an expansive conception of
causal relationships could logically extend to support universal social health insurance.
77. See generally R. NozIcK, ANARcHY, STATE AND UToPIA 54-87 (1975); Coleman, Corrective
Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEcAL STUD. 421 (1982); Epstein, Causation and Corrective
Justice: A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL STrU. 477, 489 (1979); Fried, supra note 8, at 120-
21.
78. Corrective justice is actually a structure for analyzing questions of distributional fairness.
Definitions of "wrongful" conduct, appropriate "consent," and culpable "invasions" are sup-
plied by, and will vary according to, fundamental moral and social values. See Fried, supra
note 8; Posner, supra note 8.
Rights against wrongful invasions of personal security do not necessarily imply absolute
entitlements to be free from all injury. Generally, injury would not constitute a rights-violation
if the victim consents. Actual or implied consent would be sufficient to absolve an injurer of
liability when the benefits of risk bearing exceed its costs. The problem of determining whether
to impose liability is complicated by considerations of distributional fairness. If the riskbearers
are poor, for example, the mere fact that their gain from the benefits of risky enterprise make
them better off than they would be if the enterprise were not undertaken may be insufficient
reason to justify a denial of compensation. It would be especially difficult to justify leaving the
loss where it lies when the enterprise yields disproportionately greater gains for wealthier than
for poorer segments of society.
79. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 879.
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not only by compensation after-the-fact, but also by policing the behavior
of would-be rights violators to prevent wrongful infliction of incompensable
losses-harms which cannot be compensated ex post. Recognition of this
rights-based deterrence function will have a practical effect on rule selection.
Rules which appear appropriate when the focus is exclusively on the amount
of ex post compensation victims receive may prove inadequate when com-
pared to deterrence-based approaches. While the deterrance-based approach
might promise a lower amount of ex post compensation, ultimately it may
provide greater protection for the rights at stake by reducing the chance of
wrongful infliction of substantial incompensable loss.
It is difficult to credit any rights-based objection to the cost savings from
class actions that make the tort system accessible for otherwise low-value,
unmarketable claims-claims which are too costly and uncertain to attract
contingent fee investments by competent plaintiff attorneys. Nor is there
ground for objection when such claims can only gain access by averaging
causation and damages to eliminate the expense of individualized determi-
nations in a series of trials .following resolution of the common questions.
Access, of course, need not always require averaging on an equal shares
basis to eliminate the costs of individualization. In some cases, claimants
seeking access to the system may find it in their interest to accept a higher
percentage contingent fee rather than an incremental broadening of the
classifications for averaging in the direction of treating the victim population
as an undifferentiated whole.
Significant rights-based objections to mass tort class actions arise in con-
nection with claims that would gain access to the system without the cost
savings afforded by aggregate and averaging processes. Achieving process
efficiency at the expense of these claimants' substantive rights would seem
offensive to notions of individual justice.s0 However, opposition to aggre-
gative treatment of otherwise marketable claims is often mistakenly predi-
cated on a definition of the baseline of an individual's substantive rights
that uncritically equates individual justice with separate actions." It is simply
assumed that any benefits claimants may derive from proceeding separately
from one another are necessarily entailed by the substantive rights they are
asserting. Thus, arguments that class treatment deprives claimants of power
to control the destiny of their cases frequently confuse the substantive right
of action with advantages gained by strategic exploitation of the process.
Class actions undoubtedly interfere, for example, with the freedom of
claimants to select the available venue having the highest award reputation,
or to present the case in a manner that prevents the jury from developing
80. See Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem-Auto Com-
pensation Plans, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 641 (1964).
81. See, e.g., Trangsrud, supra note 6.
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a multiple claim perspective that might induce it to moderate its compensation
or punitive damage award. But such opportunistic manipulation of judicial
processes to secure a systematically biased or myopic forum hardly comports
with notions of even-handed fairness implicit in corrective justice.82 Correc-
tive justice similarly would appear to offer little support for the proposition
that individuals are entitled to have the public subsidize their personal pref-
erence for separate lawsuits to relitigate common questions. The fact that
tort litigation confers public benefits-including deterrence of socially in-
appropriate risks, delivery of compensation to victims, fair and peaceful
resolution of disputes, and the elaboration of legal norms-certainly does
not require committing public resources beyond the point of negligible re-
turn. 3
The gap between individual and class actions is far narrower in reality
than rights-based critics of public law processes appear to recognize. In
contrast to the ideal of individual actions, the dominant feature of the tort
system in practice is the bureaucratic justice of settlement. Well over ninety
percent of all claims are resolved by settlements, which are predicated upon
relatively standardized valuation criteria that reflect the average outcomes
derived from sets of similar cases.84 Mass tort claims in particular usually
result in patterned settlements prescribing schedules of varying levels of
recovery for groups of victims defined by types of injury or other pertinent
and easily detectable characteristics."5 Moreover, given the doctrine of stare
decisis, the notion of individual control has little relevance to questions of
law, since their determination in the first case appealed will govern all future
cases arising in the same jurisdiction. 86 Nor is the choice exclusively between
82. As Professor Coffee notes, it hardly seems unfair that class actions serve to counter the
plaintiff strategy of using separate plunitive damage actions to expose defendants to "cumulative
punishment and, loosely speaking, a kind of double jeopardy." Coffee, supra note 15.
83. See Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Cm. L. Ray. 366, 392-93 (1986).
The strategic gains from public subsidies for separate actions are in any event likely to be
illusory. Because victims are and were both consumers and taxpayers, they will be charged or
taxed for a substantial portion of the extra costs. They will pay the balance, if any, in higher
attorney fees and litigation expenses.
84. See supra note 15.
85. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740; Wellington, Asbestos:
The Private Management of a Public Problem, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 375 (1984-85) (proposing
a comprehensive program, based on the agreement of the manufacturers, insurers and plaintiff
attorneys to settle all outstanding personal injury asbestos claims on the basis of a damage schedule
applied through an arbitration mechanism).
86. Generally, there is no reality to the notion that claimants have significant personal
influence or involvment, let alone control regarding the course of litigation and settlement, other
than wielding some degree of ultimate veto power over the settlement price. See Williams, supra
note 17. Although some commentators suggest that the lawyer's dominant role is the product
of professional elitism, see, e.g., Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rav.. 29, the more persuasive explanation for the control
exercised by lawyers at least in personal injury cases is that under the contingent fee arrangement
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class treatment and opting out to an individual action. Bifurcated class
actions offer the cost savings of aggregate adjudication of common questions
along with respect for the power of claimants to obtain and control through
their own counsel an individual trial on damages and other noncommon
questions.8 7
Rights-based criticism faults class actions for encouraging class attorneys
to strike "sweetheart" settlements with defendants, trading a portion of the
compensation due victims for a premium on, or merely the certainty of, the
fee recovery. This form of lawyer disloyalty is clearly not created by the
class action procedure; it is an ineradicable feature of every settlement
negotiation, especially in the personal injury context of plaintiff attorneys
repeatedly bargaining with the same defendant representatives or, more likely
their insurers, and providing their services under contingent fee arrange-
ments.8" But because of the aggregate stakes involved and authorization for
pervasive judicial scrutiny of fees and settlements, the incentives for plaintiff
attorney disloyalty are likely to be lower in class actions than in separate
actions.
It is true that when plaintiff attorneys have only a fractional interest in
the recovery under a contingent fee arrangement, they will invest less in the
claim than would claimants who possess sufficient resources to finance the
litigation themselves. Yet, that differential in interest (termed "conflict" by
some) may be negligible in most class actions because. they increase the
lawyer's stakes, aligning the optimal points of investment preferred by both
attorney and client. Because the attorney's stake in a class action is many
times greater than it is in a separate action, the attorney's investment will
also be far greater in the class tharr in a separate action. Despite having
only a fractional interest, the class attorney will have sufficient incentives to
invest at the level which closely approximates if it does not equal the in-
vestment level claimants able to finance their own litigation would regard
as optimal. While the interests of lawyer and claimants in class actions are
asymmetric, the claimant having a much larger expected interest in the
outcome than the contingent fee class attorney, this differential is irrelevant
as long as the lawyer's interest is sufficiently great to warrant an investment
they are the principle risk bearers.
The myth of personal control might be tolerated as a quaint and rhetorical reminder of how
far the common law of torts has moved from a private law mode of resolving disputes towards
a system of regulating the risks of social enterprise based upon bureaucratic standardization of
claim recognition and redress. Compare the prediction in Holmes, Path of the Law, 10 HARv.
L. Rzv. 457, 467 (1897). But when this myth is trotted out to excuse the needless and destructive
costs of case-by-case processing of mass tort claims, the time for its abandonment is at hand.
87. See supra note 32.
88. See generally F. MAcKiNNON, CorrMNoET FaEs FoR LEGAL SEavicas (1964); H. Ross,
supra note 17; Schwartz & Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal
Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1125 (1970).
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at the claimant's optimal level. Asymmetry in the stakes does not preclude
a common point of optimal investment; for example, regardless of the stakes
a party will pay no more than the market rate for the best available expert
witness.8 9
The problem of attorney disloyalty is compounded, according to the critics,
by conflicts among claimants concerning distribution of settlement funds.
In order to win claimant approval for the settlement, the class attorney may
propose to distribute the fund according to a schedule which disproportion-
ately favors the numerous low value claims over usually far less numerous
high value claimsY° The potential for such extortionate behavior by factions
with lower value claims, as well as the potential for plaintiff attorneys to
strike a "sweetheart" settlement with the defendant, can be checked by
subclassing and judicial supervision of the settlement.9 1 Because the value
of claims can easily and objectively be differentiated by the severity of injury
and the amount of economic losses, both subclassing and judicial scrutiny
of proposed settlement distributions are effective safeguards.9
89. Cf. Coffee, supra note 15 (noting that in high damage class actions the asymmetric stakes
of plaintiff attorneys and defendant firms may not create the incentives for abusive tactics by
the latter that such asymmetry would in separation actions).
Professor Coffee notes the prevalence of the "lodestar formula" in setting class attorney fees,
and the potential for this time-based approach to create incentives for the class attorney to
negotiate collusive "sweetheart" agreements with defendants. See Coffee, supra note 15. His
analysis, however, overlooks the formula's allowance for adjustments to provide risk, success,
and benefit premiums-designed to encourage competent attorneys to undertake and adequately
prosecute complex class actions. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984). Courts use these
adjustments to prevent collusive settlements. In addition, judicial scrutiny of the settlement and
class attorney fee deters collusion.
For these reasons and because promising alternatives exist, it is premature for Professor Coffee
to call for a return to the "traditional 'salvage value' or 'percentage of the recover' fee formula."
Coffee, supra note 15. Among the alternatives that should be investigated are the use of
a bidding process to select the class attorney and the authorization for attorneys to purchase
claims outright from victims. See Rosenberg, supra note 7; Shukaitis, A Market in Personal
Injury Tort Claims (1986) (Discussion Paper, Program in Law and Economics at Harvard Law
School). The winning bid would provide a basis for gauging the success of and appropriate
compensation for the actual outcome achieved by the class attorney. Allowing the class attorney
to purchase claims for their expected value minus costs would eliminate conflicts of interest
between the class and the class attorney. See also Clermont & Currivan, Improving the Contin-
gency Fee, 63 eoRNELL L. Ray. 529 (1978). Such alternatives represent the productive possibilities
that have been suppressed by anti-competitive regulation of the market for legal services in
personal injury cases, such as the prohibitions against solication, barratry, champerty, and
maintenance.
90. As Professor Coffee points out, such redistribution of compensation entitlements from
high to low value claimants may occur independently of class attorney disloyalty. If, for example,
class approval of the settlement requires a simple or super majority vote of all claimants, where
each claimant has an equal vote (or at least where the voting power carries a weight exceeding
the claimant's relative entitlement share of the settlement fund), it is possible that a coalition
of lower value claimants will form and threaten to block settlement as a means of extracting
some side-payment from the higher value claimants. See Coffee, supra note 15.
91. Both subclassing and judicial approval of settlement are authorized by FED. R. Cirv. P.
23.
92. Professor Coffee, recognizing the similarities between factional conflicts in plaintiff classes
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Critics recognize that class settlements are subject to judicial oversight and
approval, but they argue that transaction costs will prevent dissatisfied class
members from organizing to make an effective case in opposing the settle-
ment. In the absence of an effectively organized opposition, courts will lack
sufficient impetus to conduct a searching review of proposed class settle-
ments. 93 These concerns appear misplaced. First, the cost barrier to orga-
nization is far more realistic in small claim class actions, such as those
typically involving consumer, securities, and corporate fraud cases, than in
mass tort class actions-especially where the claims are marketable as sep-
arate actions-involving severe personal injury.94 A second reason why doubts
about the effectiveness of class opposition to settlement are overbroad is
that they fail to distinguish between the ability and incentives of the class
representative to supervise the class attorney's day-to-day litigation decisions,
and the ability and incentives of all class members-whose stakes are pre-
sumably quite high given that their claims were individually marketable
despite the enormous litigation costs-to organize when their interests have
been focused and merged by the proposed settlement. 95
The danger of class attorney disloyalty and extortionate behavior by lower
value claimants cannot be denied nor can it be policed perfectly, and certainly
the costs of judicial intervention might be substantial.9 6 Yet, if the choice
of seeking class certification is left to plaintiffs, there is a countervailing
danger, more grounded in reality, that plaintiff attorneys will sabotage the
possibility of a class treatment to preserve their contingent fees, disregarding
and in the labor union context, correctly observes that the defendant like an employer engaged
in collective bargaining may play subclasses off against each other. See Coffee, supra note 15.
But, as in labor negotiations, subclasses can counter such a strategy by coordinating the timing
and substance of their bargaining positions. The labor analogy also teaches that the strongest
faction, which in the class context would be the subclass comprising the highest value claims,
can resist whipsaw tactics because it has a sufficient basis for making a credible threat of forcing
the defendant into a costly trial (the equivalent of going on strike).
Judicial review of class settlements provides additional, if not a wholly sufficient, protection
against strategic bargaining by defendants. Any possibility that settlements with subclasses of
lower value claims will exhaust defendant assets can be dealt with by the court's suspending
distribution of all or part of the settlement proceeds until after the higher value claims are tried.
93. See Dam, supra note 17.
94. See id.
95. Indeed, the court might facilitate such organization by appointing a lawyer to oppose
the settlement.
96. But recognizing the risk does not concede the reality. There is no empirical evidence that
settlements disproportionately favoring relatively low value claimants have actually occurred.
Moreover, the mere skewing of recovery in favor of lower value claims would not be sufficient
evidence of attorney disloyalty. The tilt might well be explained by the fact that more severe
injuries are likely to entail greater complexity, and hence disproportionately greater litigation
expense.
In addition, taxing relatively high value claimants for the benefit of low value claims that
might otherwise be unmarketable to the plaintiff class attorney is not unfair when the transfer
confers gains upon the high value claimants in terms of the enhanced deterrence value from an
increase in the overall liability threat. See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 917-18.
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the interests of victims. Plaintiff attorneys are likely to be abetted in this
effort by their professional counterparts on the defense side, whose fees are
equally threatened by class action efficiencies.
Deciding whether an expression of dissatisfaction with class treatment
serves the interests of the plaintiffs or their attorneys will be difficult only
when the cost saving from class treatment is relatively low, and the settlement
schedule substantially diverges from generally established compensation pat-
terns for severity of injury and amounts of economic loss involved. While
those conditions are unlikely to obtain in mass tort cases involving high
value claims, courts might avoid the costs of detecting whether the motive
for opposition to class treatment is attorney disloyalty by allowing subclasses
of dissatisfied claimants to opt out of the proposed settlement class to
prosecute individual damage trials. Permission for this limited opt-out should
be granted only on the condition that the exiting claimants pay their share
of the litigation costs and fees relating to the class attorney's discovery and
other work in preparing the plaintiffs' case on the common questions. To
further deter attorney disloyalty, opt-out claimants should also be required
to pay a user fee equal to the public costs of conducting the separate damage
trials. 97
II. INTERSECTIONS OF INDWIDuAL AND BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE
This section redirects the focus from concerns about cost and information
barriers as justifications of mass tort class actions to individual justice
considerations. The present inquiry asks whether the ends of individual
justice-the tailored application of governing norms to the circumstances
and interests of the particular parties-may be more effectively served by
class treatment of mass tort claims than by the system's traditional disag-
gregative process. For purposes of this inquiry it is assumed that neither the
quality of nor the expense of developing post-accident information regarding
issues of causation and damages makes class treatment necessary or expe-
dient. Class treatment of mass accident claims, for example, is not required
because efforts to particularize causal relationships into small reference groups
or even down to the level of individuals is impractical, or, indeed, because
97. A sinfilar approach, albeit without the user fee component, is being developed for the
comprehensive settlement of personal injury claims arising from occupational exposure to as-
bestos. See Wellington, supra note 85. Professor Coffee suggests an effective and perhaps
complementary solution, which would limit the plaintiff attorney fees to that portion of any
damages recovered in the individual actions in excess of what the claimant would have received
under the class settlement. See Coffee, A Policy Primer on Class Action Reform, 62 IND. L.
J. 625 (1987); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
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causal indeterminacy may actually increase when the data is stratified. 8 Thus,
it is assumed that there are neither cost nor information barriers to deter-
mining the ratio of excess risk to background risk in a mass toxic tort case
in terms of a hierarchy of discrete, relatively homogeneous subclasses or
even in terms of the personal "risk portfolio" of each victim.
Even under these assumptions about accurate information and low ad-
ministrative costs, the use of which make disaggregative processes unreal-
istically plausible, there are important areas where the ends of individual
justice are better served by public law processes. These intersections where
collective processes reinforce individualism have one prominent common
feature: each involves situations in which the ex ante relationship between
the parties entails distributive effects resulting from the class-wide risk of
accident, effects which have legal significance according to the substantive
and remedial norms of tort law. Because of the tort system's traditional
disaggregative processes, however, these ex ante distributional effects are
likely to be ignored in the determination of liability and damages.
These processes, which trained attention unrelentingly on the particulars
of each claim, tend to predispose courts in conducting their retrospective
accident investigations to view the causal relationship between a plaintiff's
ex post injuries and the defendant's ex ante conduct as linear and deter-
minate. Constrained to focus on the tangible specifics of this direct and one-
to-one conception of the causal relationship, courts are apt to neglect the
systemic, class-wide nature and distributional effects of the mass accident
risk in the ex ante context. Judicial myopia is fairly assured by the fact that
when individual claimants proceed by separate rather than class actions,
none will have sufficient incentives to develop information regarding these
ex ante conditions. This is because the costs of production, which usually
exceed the value of such information in any given case, cannot be recouped
from the other claimants who will share in its benefits. By preventing, or
at least strongly inhibiting, inquiry into the class-wide nature and effects of
the niass accident risk in the ex ante context, disaggregative processes un-
dermine the objectives of individual justice: tailored determination of liability
and damages.
The balance of this section elaborates the ex ante distributional effects of
disaggregative processes on application of the due care liability norm and
the make-whole remedial norm. It also demonstrates that the ends of in-
98. In some degree of correspondence, causal uncertainty will increase as the risk criteria
for subgrouping the exposed population become more refined. Not only is it possible that the
reliability of causal inferences will diminish as the subgroup becomes smaller and more distinctive.
See Epstein, supra note 24, at 1380; Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAUF. L. Rnv. 1735,
1823-24 (1985). But indeterminacy may also arise because assigning relative values to stratification
factors and determining the order in which they are added to derive subgroup boundaries inject
other elements of significant ambiguity into the picture. See Lagokos & Mosteller, supra note
38; Rosenberg, supra note 38.
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dividual justice in the application of these norms may require abandoning
the dissagregative process in favor of the collective means of bureaucratic
justice.
A. The Due Care Liability Norm and the Inseparable Nature of
Ex Ante Risks
The due care standard of liability requires courts to compare the accident
prevention efforts made by the defendant against the probable loss that will
result from varying levels of care. In rights-based terms, due care mediates
between competing entitlements of autonomy, action and security by defining
limits to the risks one may impose on another. Risk imposition is not per
se an infringement of right, but at some point the risk/benefit ratio will be
found excessive and grounds for holding the defendant liable.
Disaggregative processes may, however, prevent courts from recognizing
excessive mass accident risk in the case of victims whose losses are relatively
low. When considered in isolation, the potential loss of each such victim
will appear insignificant compared to the care taken by the defendant firm.
The firm's investment in accident prevention will indeed dwarf the interests
at stake for any given victim, even those who suffer relatively high value
losses. This results from the fact that, in mass accident situations, the firm's
accident prevention measures are of necessity the product of a collective,
undifferentiated assessment of the probable loss from its activities for the
class of potential victims as a whole; and, correspondingly, care-taking
usually cannot be adjusted on an individualized basis.
Because mass accident risks are indivisibly imposed on the class, an ac-
curate determination of whether firms have taken appropriate care requires
that courts, like the firms themselves, sum the expected losses for all members
of the at-risk population, making the comparison of both the care and loss
factors on a class-wide basis. Disaggregative processes, however, may lead
a court to focus on the probable loss for the particular claimant in the case,
and compare it to the care that the defendant has taken, which necessarily
is class-wide in character. Such an asymmetrical derivation of the care-
probable loss ratio would support denial of liability for the relatively low
value claims. For if each case is treated as separately arising from a discrete
relationship between the defendant firm and the particular claimant, the
court will frequently find that the defendant's class-wide investment in care
more than satisfies the concern it owed to the victim.
In rights-based terms, such comparisons of individual expected loss to class-
wide care is distributionally unfair in two respects. First, to deny liability on
low value claims deprives those victims of legal protection for their rights of
personal security. Second, denial of liability on those claims also reduces the
protections from the deterrent effect of threatened liability for the class as
a whole. The interest of potential victims in deterrence, which is undermined
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by disaggregative process, is unitary for the class; regardless of the value of
their future claims should they incur injury, when a significant number of
the claims will not be redressed, each member of the at-risk population
experiences an ex ante devaluation of entitlements measured by the increased
chance of suffering incompensable loss. 99
To illustrate, suppose that in the course of operating a nuclear power plant
radiation accidentally is released into the atmosphere. For the sake of sim-
plicity, assume that only two people, A and B, reside within the danger zone,
and that they live on opposite sides of the plant. If the winds blow in each
direction fifty percent of the time, each has an equal chance of suffering
radiation related disease should an accident occur. If the winds blow in A's
direction, the compensable loss will be $100 and an equal amount, figuratively
speaking, in incompensable suffering. Should the winds blow in the opposite
direction, B will incur $10 in compensable losses and the notional equivalent
loss for which damages are neither a principled nor practical substitute. In
this rights-based world, A, B, and the nuclear power firm share the benefits
of the firm's activity, and as contracting parties they are presumably in
agreement that due care requires the firm to invest up to but not beyond the
optimal amount in safety. Existing technology permits the firm to affect the
chance of an accidental release of radiation only incrementally according to
the following levels of safety investment:
Expected Loss for
Level of Care Investment Chance of Accident A(100) or B(10)
#1 0 .5 A=50 B= 5
#2 19 .2 A=20 B= 2
#3 40 .001 A=.l B =.01
On these assumptions, the firm can satisfy the due care requirement by
investing at level #3. Accident costs are minimized when 40 is invested; while
the marginal cost of care for the firm increases by 21 over the level #2
investment, the marginal decrease in the total expected loss is 21.89.100 The
decrease in total expected loss should be doubled to reflect the incompensable
loss savings produced by a level #2 investment.
Suppose that the accidental release occurs and the wind is blowing in B's
direction. In a subsequent damage action by B, it is discovered that the firm
only made the level #2 investment of 19. If the court treats B's claim as
99. See discussion of rights-based deterrence, supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
100. The marginal expected loss saving resulting from investigating 40 instead of 19 is calculated
as follows: 22 (aggregate expected loss at level #2 investment) minus .11 (aggregate expected loss
at level #3 investment) equals 21.89.
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arising from a relationship with the firm which is discrete and separate from
A's, liability may be denied. Examining the ex ante context, the court would
observe a ratio of care to expected loss for B of 19 to 2. On such an
individualized appraisal, the firm's care toward B will be seen as due, probably
even excessive. B recovers nothing and suffers incompensable loss as well.
Of course, when it invested 19, the firm ran the risk of injuring A and
incurring a negligence judgement for $100. Yet, if the threat of liability is
to A alone, the firm will not be induced ex ante to invest at level #3. For
the firm will find it profitable to invest only at level #2 notwithstanding
potential liability to A. It is cheaper for the firm to invest 19 and bear an
expected liability of 20 (.2 x 100), for a total operating cost of 39 than it
would be to invest 40 and bear no liability.
The most dramatic effect of disaggregative treatment is not only that B's
entitlements are entirely unprotected. But it is that A's rights, while fully
protected against compensable losses, are devalued ex ante in the example
by an increase in expected incompensable loss from .1 to 20. As the example
plainly illustrates, the fate of A's entitlements, though fully protected against
compensable losses, is nevertheless dependent upon the fate of B's; if A is
to avoid wrongfully inflicting compensable loss, infringement of B's low value
entitlements must be redressed.
The firm essentially aggregates expected costs in the ex ante context and
the court disaggregates those costs in making its ex post determination of
liability. Since expected costs are necessarily inseparable because of the class-
wide nature of the risks involved, the asymmetry in ex ante and ex post
assessments can be corrected only by judicial aggregation of expected costs
in determining liability, even in cases where the individual claimant's expected
and actual losses are relatively low. To be sure, mass accidents cause injuries
to many A's and B's, and this should be obvious to the courts that hear the
resulting claims. But when these injuries arise over time and are widely
dispersed, as is likely when long-latency disease is involved, the disaggregative
process of separate actions may lead these courts to make the error of treating
each claim as arising from a separate and discrete relationship between defend-
ant and plaintiff. If a sufficient proportion of the low-value claims are denied
because a high ratio of aggregate-care taking to individual expected loss
satisfies the due care requirement, then the entire population at-risk, including
those with relatively high-value stakes, will suffer serious incompensable losses.
B. The Make-Whole Recovery Norm and the Average Response to
Risk Ex Ante
The rights-based tort system promises to restore victims of tortious conduct
to their pre-accident distributional positions-at least with respect to com-
pensable losses. At great cost, the particulars of each victim's injury are
specifically examined and valued to the end of recompensing no more or less
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than what was taken by the defendant's tortious conduct. Yet, this process
of particularization and the presumption of a linear, discrete relationship of
defendant and victim lead courts to ignore the class-wide response to the risk
of accident by potential victims in the ex ante context. As a result, the costs
of such responses will be omitted from the judgment's accounting of injury
loss. But far more important, by ignoring the ex ante response to risk by
potential victims, the particularization of loss may defeat or impede judicial
efforts to comply with the make-whole norm. Because this ex ante response
is often formulated on a standardized basis for all or large subgroups of
potential victims, there may be cases where determining compensation ac-
cording to the class-wide average loss may achieve the normative goal more
effectively than will individualized adjudication.
If, as is plausible to assume, the members of an at-risk population are risk
averse, the ex ante response to the defendant's hazardous activities will
generally take the form of commercial or self-insurance against losses from
potential accidents. When the accident risk arises from a contractual rela-
tionship between the defendant and potential victims, the insurance will be
provided along with the product or service involved under compulsion of the
tort system. 1" The defendant obtains the policy and surcharges consumer-
potential victims for the premium. When the accident risk is imposed outside
of a contractual relationship between the defendant and potential victims,
the insurance response will be designed to make the actual victims whole by
supplementing tort damage awards. 102 The premiums for the tort insurance
represented by damage awards are not paid for by potential victims, but
rather are charged to the defendant and its customers. Potential victims in
non-contract situations, however, bear the costs of the supplementary com-
mercial or self-insurance that covers the portion of the loss not compensated
by the defendant firm in the damage award. The at-risk population thus
would insure to make victims whole by hedging against the contingent and
potentially partial recovery in cases where questions of causal indeterminacy
are resolved by a preponderance (all-or-nothing) or proportionality (appor-
tionment according to causal contribution) rule. 03
Significantly, the risk insured against and premium paid by potential vic-
tims-regardless of whether the insurance is purchased under a product or
service contract or whether it is supplementary insurance purchased outside
of a contractual setting-will often be set or calculated in terms of the average
101. See Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 648 (1985);
Rea, Comments on Epstein, 14 J. LEGAL SmTD. 671 (1985); Moore & O'Connell, Foreclosing
Medical Malpractice Claims by Prompt Tender of Economic Loss, 44 LA. L. Rnv. 1268 (1984).
102. Supplemental insurance would cover the deficit left by the tort judgment, including a
judgement denying all recovery.
103. For a general discussion of the preponderance and proportionality rules, see Rosenberg,
supra note 7.
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expected loss from a given type of injury for the at-risk population as a
whole. This is generally true for product-service insurance where transaction
and information costs are barriers to customized arrangements. Regardless
of their particular economic stations in life and risk preferences, all consumers
will pay an equal premium price under the product or service contract to
cover the same range of hazards. Having purchased the same insurance policy,
the only damage award that will restore victims of product or service risks
is one that provides compensation measured by the average loss. The dif-
ferentiation of damage awards according to the individual victim's actual
loss-consistent with the disaggregative process of the system-contravenes
the make-whole norm and anti-redistribution principles implicit in the concept
of individual justice. The effort to tailor recovery to the actual ex post loss
operates in effect as a regressive tax, redistributing income from the less well
off to the better off.
In the absence of a contractual relationship, there may be situations where
the supplementary ex ante insurance obtained by potential victims will of
necessity be based on the average probability of causation.0 4 Generally these
situations arise when potential victims are confronted by the prospect, over
which they have no practical control, that their injury will be causally in-
determinate. If, in addition, the probability of causation is a random factor,
then the ex ante insurance purchased by victims will be geared to the average
probability of causation. In order to satisfy the make-whole norm, as will
be illustrated below, such an ex ante insurance response must be taken as
prefiguring the ex post measure of damages at the average probability of
causation. Individualization of causal probabilities, whether tailored to rel-
atively small victim subclasses, or-even if it were possible to achieve the
theoretical limiting case-tailored to the particular claimant's circumstances,
will only prevent fulfillment of the remedial norm where the probability of
causation applicable to a specific claimant or subclass is below the average. 105
Returning to the nuclear power plant example for illustration of these
points, suppose that the radioactive cloud will spread the risk of a certain
type of cancer to the population living down-wind of the site. Also assume
that the chance of being stricken by radiation-related disease is solely a
function of distance from the plant site when the cloud is first encountered,
and members of the populatioi are randomly moving about the hazardous
zone so that they have no practical means of controlling the risk. If all
members of the population also bear a uniform background risk of contracting
104. In the mass tort context, the contractual and non-contractual situations are mainly
distinguished by the fact that in the latter both the factors of loss and the probability of causation
are variables, and hence each member of the at-risk population has a differential expected loss.
105. This point was initially noted in Rosenberg, Toxic Tort Litigation: Crisis or Chrysalis?
A Comment on Feinberg's Conceptual Problems and Proposed Solutions, 24 Hous. L. Ray.
183 (1987).
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the cancer in question,0 6 then they will rationally purchase insurance according
to the same probability of causation-i.e., the average for the population as
a whole. Contemplating that compensation from the tort system would be
apportioned according to the probability of causation, °0 the balance of the
expected loss for which each potential victim would purchase supplementary
insurance would be calculated on a fifty percent probability.
If, however, the probability of causation is individually determined in each
subsequent claim by a disease victim, the make-whole norm may be defeated
in a substantial number of cases. Victims whose probability of causation is
below fifty percent because they encountered the radiation cloud at a relatively
remote distance from the plant site will not receive compensation that makes
them whole. A victim whose probability of causation is inferred to be twenty
percent, for example, will receive compensation for only seventy percent of
the injury losses-twenty percent in tort damages against the nuclear power
firm and fifty percent in proceeds from the supplementary insurance pur-
chased ex ante. In contrast, computing and awarding tort damages according
to the average probability of causation for all of the mass tort victims would
make all of them whole.
CONCLUSION
Mass accident class actions achieve the tort system's basic compensation
and deterrence goals far more effectively than its traditional disaggregative
processes. The major purpose of this paper has been to demonstrate that this
conclusion remains true even when the class action imports significant ele-
ments of bureaucratic justice. Although such elements as mandatory class
treatment and damage scheduling make tort liability extremely potent, I have
shown that the fears expressed by some commentators that this will only
exacerbate the system's potential for overdeterring technological innovation
have little basis in reality. Indeed, the "public law" approach represented by
class actions minimizes the incentives for inefficiency and irrationality that
have justifiably raised concerns about whether the tort system is a sensible
mode of regulating the risks of advanced technology.
The bulk of the paper, however, concerns the compatibility of the bu-
reaucratic justice introduced through means of class actions with the system's
ideal of doing individual justice. To test the proposition that bureaucratic
justice does not subvert, but rather enhances the tort system's capacity to
achieve individual justice, the paper evaluates the performance of class treat-
ment in terms of the rights-based conception of individualistic, possessory
106. This assumption is made to simplify the example; the validity of the conclusions would
not be affected by variable background risk factor.
107. The analysis would be more complicated if the system used the traditional preponderance-
of-the-evidence rule and all-or-nothing judgments, but it would not result in a different conclusion.
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entitlements to security from wrongful injury. With respect to class treatment
of common questions the findings are unambigious. By eliminating the inef-
ficiencies of separate actions, mass accident class actions promise very sub-
stantial increases in compensation for victims. In addition, by assuring access
to the system for relatively low value claims-claims that would not be
marketable to competent plaintiff attorneys as separate actions-not only are
those claimants compensated for their losses, but also the probability of
incompensable loss is greatly reduced for all potential victims.
When the aggregative and averaging methods of bureaucratic justice are
extended to noncommon questions raised by otherwise marketable claims-
claims which do not require class treatment to gain access to the system-a
danger of redistribution from higher to lower value claimants arises. In
addition, regardless of the value of the classed claims, the class attorney has
incentives to make a collusive settlement with the defendant, trading a sig-
nificant amount of class recovery for a higher or certain attorney fee. These
problems are not unique to class actions; the settlement of separate actions
involves similar dangers of redistribution and attorney disloyalty. Moreover,
careful analysis indicates that there is less warrant for concern about these
dangers in the class action than in the separate action context. The greater
stakes for the class attorney, combined with the possibility for effective
judicial oversight of settlements and fees minimizes the risks of redistributibn
and class attorney disaffection. Judicial policing is not perfect nor are its
costs negligible. Therefore, a market-type of approach should be adopted in
certain cases-where the risks of redistribution and class attorney disloyalty
and the costs of detecting them are high-to allow exit (opting out) from
the class action's aggregative and averaged resolution of noncommon ques-
tions, particularly damages. To counter the more serious danger of plaintiff
attorneys opposing class actions to protect their fees rather than their client's
interests, permission to opt out should be conditioned on payment of the
opt-out claimant's share of the costs incurred in preparing the common
questions and of the costs represented by the public resources consumed by
the individual damage trials. This compromise of bureaucratic justice is con-
sistent with the instrumental conception of process embodied in the "public
law" model of the tort system, which seeks not purity of form but simply
to maximize substantive productivity.
The most ambitious thrust of this paper is to show that in certain contexts,
even when there exist neither cost nor information barriers preventing access
to the tort system, the aggregation and averaging of bureaucratic justice better
serves individual justice than the system's traditional disaggregative process.
Generally, this appears to be the case in mass accident situations because the
ex ante risk of injury experienced by the population of exposed victims results
in uniform and collective distributional consequences which are likely to be
ignored in assessing liability and awarding compensation ex post in the sys-
tem's traditional process. In contrast to the probabilistic and class-wide per-
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spectives engendered by the bureaucratic justice of class actions, the traditional
disaggregative process tends to seek linear, determinate, and particularized
determinations of liability and compensable loss. Necessarily such a disag-
gregative process will fail to capture collective and statistically averaged re-
sponses to ex ante risk, even though these responses have demonstrable
distributive consequences for the class of potential victims-consequences
which are substantively relevant to prevailing liability and compensation norms.
The paper sketches two examples indicating the differences in distributive
outcomes under the bureaucratic justice of class actions and the system's
private law, disaggregative processes. First, I show that the disaggregative
approach undermines the collective interest of potential class victims in rights-
based deterrence. Unless the aggregate class-wide risk of an activity is com-
pared to the defendant's safety investment, courts are likely to deny liability
in cases involving low value claims. At a certain point, especially in cases
where the choices among levels of care-taking are discontinuous, the removal
of such claims from the threat of liability may sharply reduce the defendant's
safety incentives. By thus increasing the risk of incompensable loss, the
system's disaggregative process effectively devalues the security entitlements
of the at-risk population.
Second, stimulated by conditions of ex ante risk, potential victims will
purchase insurance. When the risk is randomly distributed among the pop-
ulation of potential victims, so that none has a distinctive chance of being
injured, then insurance will be purchased to cover the average risk borne by
the population as a whole. Where the risk arises in a contractual setting, for
example consumer product injuries, the insurance will be purchased by the
potential victim as part of the product price. Because each consumer pays
an identical amount of the price as insurance premium, regardless of the
economic status each victim suffering the same physical harm should receive
compensation in equal shares computed at the average level. Ex post parti-
cularization ignores the ex ante uniformity of insurance response, and operates
as a regressive tax against low-income consumers. A similiar uniform insur-
ance response arises in non-contract settings, for example when a population
is subject to an environmental risk of disease from toxic substance exposure.
If members of the population cannot affect the chance of injury, then each
will purchase insurance based on the average probability for the population
as a whole. The insurance they purchase will be supplementary, covering gaps
in compensation provided by the tort system. However, if the ex post de-
terminations are particularistic, then a large number of victims who receive
below average (including zero) compensation from the tort system will not
be made whole by their supplementary insurance. In order to assure that all
victims are made whole by the combination of tort and private insurance,
tort compensation must be provided to all victims on an average basis.
These examples of the distributional effects of using private law process
suggest a broader critique of the traditional tort system. Its basic structure
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is flawed because its linear, determinate, and particularistic modes of adju-
dication fail to account for conditions of uncertainty, ex post as well as ex
ante. Uncertainty cannot be reduced to absolute values without depriving one
or the other party of individual justice. When such conditions of uncertainty
prevail, only a public law perspective, implemented through the bureaucratic
modes of mandatory class actions and damage scheduling, through a market
approach allowing individual damage trials as long as opt-out claimants pay
their own way, or through other means dictated by the circumstances of the
accident, can do individual justice.
